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Recent Cases
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: PENNSYLVANIA DECLARES
THE WIFE'S RIGHT TO DIVORCE FROM BED AND
BOARD AND ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
In Wiegand v. Wiegand' the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled
that two sections of the divorce law,2 providing the wife with di-
vorce from bed and board3 and alimony pendente lite,4 were uncon-
stitutional with respect to the Equal Rights Amendment to the
Pennsylvania Constitution.' This represents the first appellate de-
cision in Pennsylvania to utilize the recently adopted6 Equal
Rights Amendment to strike down domestic relation statutes which
supply rights and remedies exclusively to the wife. Because the
amendment prohibits the assignment of rights using sex as the
sole criterion, the court reasoned that these two statutes could no
longer pass constitutional muster.
1. 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-98 (1955).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955). The statute reads in part:
Upon complaint, and due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife
to obtain a divorce from bed and board, whenever it shall be
judged, in the manner hereinafter provided in cases of divorce,
that her husband has .... (emphasis added).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1973). The statute provides in
part:
In case of divorce from the bonds of matrimony or bed and board,
the court may, upon petition, in proper cases, allow a wife a reason-
able alimony pendente lite and reasonable counsel fees and ex-
penses (emphasis added).
5. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
6. The citizens of Pennsylvania voted to add the Equal Rights
Amendment to the state constitution on May 18, 1971.
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Sara Wiegand filed a complaint in divorce from bed and board,
and a petition for alimony pendente lite and counsel fees and expen-
ses with the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The
court ordered her husband, Myron Wiegand, to pay $875 alimony
pendente lite and $250 preliminary counsel fees. Wiegand complied
with the order for several years until his wife filed petitions for ad-
ditional counsel fees and costs for continued or increased alimony
pendente lite. As a result of these petitions the court ordered Wie-
gand to pay his wife the additional sums of $5,000 counsel fees and
$82.80 in costs. On appeal to the superior court, Wiegand argued
that the additional amount awarded for counsel fees was excessive.
In addition, he alleged that the trial court had erred in refusing
to allow cross examination of his wife to determine what she had
done with the money previously paid to her under the court or-
der.
7
The court considered neither of these issues in its opinion. In-
stead, it felt that the overriding question of the constitutional va-
lidity of these statutes, in light of the Equal Rights Amendment,
was the proper manner to dispose of the case." The court reasoned
that the Equal Rights Amendment requires that both divorce from
bed and board and alimony pendente lite should be available to
either spouse, provided that they meet the qualifications set out in
the statutes. Articulating this as a "reciprocal rights" test the court
stated: "Legislation providing for such reciprocal rights would
clearly meet the constitutional test of the Amendment. . . ." Since
the husband was not provided with the reciprocal right to bring an
action for alimony pendente lite or divorce from bed and board, the
court declared these sections of the divorce law'0 unconstitutional."
7. Sara Wiegand had received about $50,000 in alimony pendente lite
from the date of the initial order, August 14, 1967, to the date of the second
order to pay additional counsel fees, March 10, 1972. She also admitted
receiving other payments of $100,000 from her husband in the form of gifts
and earnings from business ventures which they had jointly entered.
8. Ordinarily, an appellate court in Pennsylvania is bound to con-
sider only those questions raised by the appellant in his brief. PA. R.
SUPER. CT. 42 provides in part: "ordinarily no point will be considered
which is not set forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested
thereby." However, courts sometime consider it within their inherent
power to raise an issue on their own motion which had not been raised by
either party. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIvIL PROCEDURE 250 (1972), which at
n.125 cites the following cases in which courts have done this: United
States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957); Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938); Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk and Cream Co., 308
N.Y. 342, 126 N.E.2d 271 (1955).
9. Wiegand v. Weigand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 282, 310 A.2d 426, 428
(1973).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-98 (1955).
The constitutional issue which the Wiegand court decided to
confront is of fairly recent origin in Pennsylvania. What has been
popularly referred to as the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was
added to Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution 12 on May 18,
1971. It provides:
Prohibition against denial or abridgement of equality of
rights because of sex. Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.
13
The purpose of the ERA is to achieve equality of rights for women
in the areas of politics, education, and economics. 14 Its basic prin-
ciple is that sex should no longer be used as a classification upon
which legal rights and disabilities are assigned. In short, sex is a
prohibited classification.' 5 Accordingly, those statutes which use
sex as their basis will be declared unconstitutional.
Prior to the ERA the only method available to fight sex-based
discrimination was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 16 However, the
Supreme Court, and the courts of the various states, have been hesi-
tant to declare a law unreasonable under the fourteenth amend-
ment because of sexual classifications. 17 Indeed, Reed v. Reed,'8
11. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 285, 310 A.2d 426, 429
(1973).
12. PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 27.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843,
844 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
15. For an excellent commentary on all facets of the ERA, see Brown,
Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Consti-
tutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). This
work's statement of the basic principle underlying the ERA is quoted by
many courts, including Wiegand. It reads at 80 YALE L.J. 889:
The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex
is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women,
or of men. This means that the treatment of any person by the law
may not be based upon the circumstance that such person is of one
sex or the other. The law does, of course, impose different bene-
fits or different burdens upon different members of the society.
That differentiation in treatment may rest upon particular charac-
teristics or traits of the persons affected, such as strength, intelli-
gence, and the like. But under the Equal Rights Amendment the
existence of such a characteristic or trait to a greater degree in one
sex does not justify classification by sex rather than by the par-
ticular characteristic or trait. Likewise the law may make differ-
ent rules for some people than for others on the basis of the activity
they are engaged in or the function they perform. But the fact
that in our present society members of one sex are more likely
to be found in a particular activity or to perform a particular func-
tion does not allow the law to fix legal rights by virtue of member-
ship in that sex. In short, sex is a prohibited classification.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 "[Nor shall any state] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
17. See Comment, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We
Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499-554 (1971);
Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 875-82
(1971).
18. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The case involved the constitutional validity
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decided in 1971, appears to be the first case in which the Supreme
Court has held that a state statute giving preference to males over
females created a classification which was arbitrary and unreason-
able and in violation of due process. The Pennsylvania courts have
long followed the Supreme Court's example of upholding state
laws which accord different treatment to the sexes, provided that
these classifications "are based upon reasonable and not arbitrary
or capricious or unjustly discriminating differences . .. "19 Thus,
it seems that the equal protection clause is not the proper vehicle
to eliminate sexual classifications, since a finding by the court that a
sexual classification is reasonable would allow it to continue. It was
this refusal by the courts to declare sexual classifications, per se,
to be violative of the equal protection clause 20 which led many pro-
ponents of women's rights to push for an Equal Rights Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.
As previously mentioned, it is hoped that the ERA will achieve
equality for women in the areas of politics, education, and econ-
omics. 2 ' However, the Wiegand court noted that the Amendment
is not restricted exclusively to these areas. It is just as validly ap-
plied to domestic relation statutes that determine rights and lia-
bilities on the basis of sex. 22 Many statutes relating to marriage
and divorce assign rights and duties to husband and wife based
upon their traditional role in the family.2 3 That such statutes rest
of a section of the Idaho probate code, IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948), which
gave preference to males in the appointment of administrators, over fe-
males of the same qualifications. The Idaho Supreme Court in Reed v.
Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970), upheld the validity of the statute
because it eliminated an area of controversy which would have to be de-
cided on the merits, thus improving the efficiency of the probate court.
The Supreme Court conceded that reducing the workload of the probate
court was a legitimate state objective. However, the Court further held
that advancing this objective by creating arbitrary classifications based
on sex was violative of the fourteenth amendment.
19. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 648, 243 A.2d 400, 403 (1968).
20. E.g., Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968), a
case which dealt with the constitutionality of the Muncy Act which pro-
vided different sentences for women than for men convicted of the same
crime. On the subject of sexual classifications, the court stated:
A classification by sex alone would not, per se, offend the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. For example,
there are undoubtedly significant biological, natural and practical
differences between men and women which would justify, under
certain circumstances, the establishment of different employment
qualification standards.
Id. at 649, 243 A.2d at 403.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 284, 310 A.2d 426, 429
(1973), quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843,
844 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
23. See generally Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights
on sex classification is apparent.
In divorce from bed and board 4 and alimony pendente lite25
Wiegand dealt with two such statutes which gave rights to the wife
alone. Divorce from bed and board provided the wife with a judi-
cial separation "6 in which she was still legally married27 and en-
titled to receive support from her husband in the form of alimony. 28
It was little more than a judicial separation allowing her to live
apart from her husband without being guilty of desertion.29 The
law of divorce from bed and board can be contrasted with that of
permanent divorce, or what is known in Pennsylvania as a divorce
from the bond of matrimony. 30  In general, the statutory provi-
sions for permanent divorce were enacted with the legislative in-
tent of placing the divorced parties in equal positions."' The cause
of action is available to either spouse, and with one minor excep-
tion, 12 the husband is not required to pay alimony for the support
of his wife once a permanent divorce is decreed. 33 Thus, under
Pennsylvania law alimonV iq decreed only in the case of divorce
from bed and board.
34
The wife also had the remedy of petitioning the court for rea-
sonable alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and expenses.35 These
awards differed in nature from support, because their main purpose
was to provide the wife with sufficient funds to either bring or
Amendment in Pennsylvania, 77 DICK. L. RPv. 254 (1973). This work re-
lates how the support of the family has historically been the duty of the
husband. Accordingly, the major support statutes in Pennsylvania vest in
the wife the right to bring an action against her husband for his failure to
provide maintenance and support. The language of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 131 (1965) is typical of the support statutes. It reads:
If any man shall separate himself from his wife or children with-
out reasonable cause, and, being of sufficient ability, shall neglect
or refuse to provide suitable maintenance for his said wife or chil-
dren, action may be brought . . . against such husband for mainte-
nance of said wife or children. .
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1973).
26. E.g., McFarland v. McFarland, 176 Pa. Super. 342, 346, 107 A.2d
615, 617 (1954).
27. E.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 525, 32 A.2d 921,
926 (1943).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 47 (1955).
29. E.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 525, 32 A.2d 921,
926 (1943).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955).
31. E.g., Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 512, 187 A. 245, 247
(1936); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 119 Pa. Super. 380, 381, 181 A. 458
(1935); Myers v. Myers, 17 D. & C. 236, 238 (C.P. Clinton 1931).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (1955). This section provides that in
the event a husband or wife obtains a permanent divorce from an insane
spouse, the husband or wife, if of sufficient means, must pay alimony to
the insane spouse.
33. E.g., Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 512, 187 A. 245, 247
(1936).
34. Id.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1973).
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defend against an action for divorce.3 6 Here, the primary concern
of the legislature was that the wife would not be denied justice in
a divorce proceeding because of insufficient funds.
Since the enactment of the ERA in Pennsylvania, both divorce
from bed and board and alimony pendente lite, along with the sup-
port statutes, have been the subjects of constitutional challenges.
Wiegand reviewed a number of these cases in order to support its
holding that a statute which denies reciprocal rights to the sexes is
unconstitutional. Of primary importance to Wiegand was the dis-
senting opinion in the case of Henderson v. Henderson.3 7 Hen-
derson, by an equally divided six man court, upheld per curiam the
lower court decision of the constitutional validity of alimony pen-
dente lite.38 Since all seven judges of the superior court partici-
pated in the Wiegand decision, the effect is a reversal of its earlier
holding in the Henderson case. The dissent in Henderson was
thorough in its analysis, often applying the rules of statutory and
constitutional construction to discover the meaning of the alimony
pendente lite statute 9 and to interpret the version of the ERA
adopted in Pennsylvania. 40 Relying upon the rule of constitutional
construction that words in the constitution must be given their com-
mon or popular meaning,41 the dissent found that the ERA does
not except from its coverage the area of domestic relations. 42 Us-
ing the principle of statutory construction that a statute must be
given its plain and obvious meaning, 43 the dissent refused to in-
terpret the meaning of the word "wife" to also include "spouse."
The dissent noted that this latter interpretation, while upholding
the statute's constitutionality by making alimony pendente lite
available to husband and wife, would amount to judicial legisla-
tion. 44  Like Wiegand, the Henderson dissent utilized a "recip-
36. E.g., Belsky v. Belsky, 196 Pa. Super. 374, 379, 175 A.2d 348, 350
(1961); Wargo v. Wargo, 184 Pa. Super. 587, 589, 136 A.2d 163, 165
(1957).
37. 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843, 844 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
38. Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1973).
40. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
41. As authority for this proposition the dissent cited: Busser v.
Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 449, 128 A. 80, 83 (1925); Lighton v. Abington Town-
ship, 336 Pa. 345, 354-55, 9 A.2d 609, 613 (1939); Breslow v. Baldwin
Township School Dist., 408 Pa. 121, 125, 182 A.2d 501, 504 (1962).
42. Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843, 844
(1973) (dissenting opinion).
43. Id. As authority the dissent cited: Commonwealth ex rel. Cart-
wright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 645, 40 A.2d 30, 33 (1944); Davis v.
Sulcove, 416 Pa. 138, 143-44, 205 A.2d 89, 91 (1964); In re Pgh. Beer Corp.
Liquor License, 216 Pa. Super. 71, 77, 260 A.2d 493, 495 (1969).
44. Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843, 844
rocal rights" test to determine constitutionality under the ERA.
Applying this test the court stated:
Were such a reciprocal arrangement (as exists for support)
established by § 46, allocating the responsibility to ad-
vance pendente lite costs on the basis of need and ability,
the Act would pass constitutional muster. However, the
statute as it now is enacted lacks such a provision. It is
precisely the present unilateral benefit to women, but not
men, which violates the Equality of Rights Amendment.4 5
This is much the same reasoning which Wiegand used to declare
both alimony pendente lite and divorce from bed and board uncon-
stitutional.
46
Three other Pennsylvania cases of note which dealt with the
validity of divorce and support statutes were examined in Wiegand.
Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens47 upheld the constitution-
ality of Pennsylvania's support laws. 48 Corso v. Corso49 declared
divorce from bed and board violative of the ERA, and its companion
as ,- -u. , ."7. reached * same conclsiO 1rTi1h reard tocase, i-..,n u. ,, c , L±±= ~me.. ........ --
alimony pendente lite.
Given the contrasting results of these cases, the court in Wie-
gand compared them in order to illustrate the workings of this
"reciprocal rights" test of constitutionality which it employed. A
review of these cases and the statutes involved5 ' will illuminate
the conclusion reached in Wiegand: a statute must provide recip-
rocal rights to be valid under the ERA.
Corso was the first case in Pennsylvania to utilize the ERA to
strike down a domestic relations statute. Since it was a new trend
in the law the court carefully and thoroughly considered all the re-
levant factors underlying the law of domestic relations and the
ERA, concluding that divorce from bed and board was unconstitu-
tional because only the wife was entitled to bring a cause of action. 52
By way of dicta, the Corso court also stated that the support laws
were invalid because they granted rights to the wife only: "It thus
appears that Article I, Section 27 of the Constitution as amended,
(1973) (dissenting opinion). As authority the dissent cited: Common-
wealth v. Armao, 446 Pa. 325, 338, 286 A.2d 626, 632 (1972); State Bd. of
Chiropractic Exam. v. Life Fellowship of Pennsylvania, 441 Pa. 293, 300,
272 A.2d 478, 482 (1971); Saulsburg v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316,
320, 196 A.2d 664, 667 (1964).
45. Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. 182, 303 A.2d 843, 844
(1973) (dissenting opinion).
46. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 285, 310 A.2d 426, 429
(1973).
47. 60 Del. Co. 170 (Pa. C.P. 1972), aff'd, 224 Pa. Super. 227, 303
A.2d 522 (1973).
48. See note 21 supra.
49. 120 Pitts L.J. 183, 198 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
50. 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 164, 165 (C.P. Allegh. 1972).
51. See also Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amend-
ment in Pennsylvania, 77 DICK. L. REv. 254, 270-72 (1973).
52. Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitts. L.J. 183, 198 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
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abolished the matter of substantive rights, remedies and liabilities
of women for support .... ,,53 Thus, the court in Wiegand af-
firmed the decision of the common pleas court in Corso, that di-
vorce from bed and board was unconstitutional because it did not
afford equal rights to the sexes. Although not utilizing a recipro-
cal rights test, the Corso decision stands firmly against any family
law statute which affords unequal treatment to husband and wife.
In Kehl, the companion case of Corso, the court held that alimony
pendente lite was invalid, for the same reasons given in Corso.54
In Lukens the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
upheld the validity of the state's support laws.55 A husband who
had been ordered to pay support alleged that the support laws af-
forded unilateral benefits to his wife.56 The court refused to accept
this argument on two grounds. First, the court incorrectly per-
ceived the husband's contentions to mean that the support statutes
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5r
After a discussion of the marital obligations of husband and wife,
the court concluded that the classification created by the support
laws did not arbitrarily or unreasonably deny the husband equality
of rights simply because of his sex." Rather, the laws as written
were necessary to enforce the support obligations which the hus-
band assumed by entering into the marriage contract. Thus, this
sexual classification was reasonable because it "does not require the
husband to do any more than what he originally consented to do
by marrying his wife.159 Using this approach the court never
considered the problems raised by the ERA, but erroneously con-
fined the argument to the reasonable classification test of the four-
teenth amendment.
The court's second basis for disallowing the challenge was a
finding of reciprocity; under limited conditions a husband has the
right to support.60 Under Section 197361 of the "Poor Laws," an
53. Id. at 188.
54. Kehl v. Kehl, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 164, 165 (C.P. Allegh. 1972).
55. Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens, 60 Del. Co. 170, 173 (Pa.
C.P. 1972). See note 23 supra.
56. In particular the husband contended that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4321 (1973) was violative of the ERA because under the statute a wife
could seek support from the husband, but the husband did not have the re-
ciprocal right to bring an action of support against his wife. He cited
Corso as authority.
57. Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens, 60 Del. Co. 170, 172
(Pa. C.P. 1972). In this regard the court stated: "Thus, the question be-
fore this court is: Whether the Act of 1939 is based upon a reasonable
classification." Id. at 172.
58. Id. at 173.
59. Id.
60. Id.
indigent husband is entitled to support from his wife, provided she
has the financial means to do so. Because the husband has this
single right to support from the wife, the court reasoned that the re-
quirements of the ERA had been satisfied. But even here the court
could not refrain from using a form of analysis usually associated
with the equal protection clause.62 Finally, the court, in obvious
reference to traditional family roles, summarized its attitude: "This
Court considers it unfair, oppressive and unjust to deprive a needy
wife of support under the guise of the Equal Rights Amendment
"65
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court6 4 affirmed this
decision of the lower court. However, the superior court was more
cognizant of the equal rights challenge to the support laws and ad-
dressed this argument in terms other than entirely equal protec-
tion language. The superior court placed particular emphasis upon
the husband's right to support from his wife under the indi-
gencv laws That is, if the entire range of support statutes which
exist under state law are examined, it can be seen that the hus-
band is not totally denied the right to bring an action for support
against his wife. The court then reasoned that since both sexes are
given the right to seek support, the support laws have con-
formed to the requirements of the ERA. The imbalance of the
remedies in favor of the wife did not escape the court's attention,
for it stated:
Since such a reciprocal arrangement exists under our sup-
port statutes, we hold that, while there may not be math-
ematically precise equality, these statutes create a substan-
tial right to support for both sexes. Therefore, they do not
deny rights on the impermissible classification of the sex
of the individual.6 5
Moreover, the court distinguished Corso on the basis that it dealt
with a statute, divorce from bed and board, which assigned rights
to the wife alone, while at issue in Lukens were the support laws
which at least do provide the husband with a cause of action when
he is indigent. 68
The superior court adopted this precise reasoning in Wiegand
when it contrasted the Corso and Kehl cases with both Lukens
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968).
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens, 60 Del. Co. 170, 173-74
(Pa. C.P. 1972). The court stated: "However, the Act of 1937 is suffi-
ciently broad to allow a husband to seek support. Thus, the law
does not arbitrarily deprive a husband from support as the Respondent
contends." Id. at 173-74.
63. Id. at 174.
64. Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. 227, 303
A.2d 522 (1973).




decisions.6 7 In Corso and Kehl the statutes in question provided
no rights at all to the husband, under any circumstances. There-
fore, they were held to be unconstitutional. Because the statutes
examined in the Lukens decisions afforded substantial rights to both
spouses, they were held to be valid. From this comparison the
Wiegand court formulated the rule that a statute must provide re-
ciprocal rights to both spouses, the statute would have to be re-
Using this test, it was an easy matter for the superior court in Wie-
gand to declare the statutes in question unconstitutional. Section
11 of the divorce law 68 specifically states that only the wife may
bring an action for divorce from bed and board. To grant truly re-
ciprocal rights to both spouses, the statutes would have to be re-
worded to read "spouse" whenever the word "wife" appears. This
is the form used in setting out the statute for a divorce from the
bond of matrimony, 69 which is intended to operate equally between
the sexes. This analysis likewise applies to the decision in Wie-
gand regarding alimony pendente lite. If the legislative purpose be-
hind the act was to insure that lack of financial means would not
work to the disadvantage of the wife in a divorce proceeding, then
the ERA requires that this right to alimony pendente lite should
also accrue to the husband in a divorce proceeding when he lacks
the financial ability and his wife has the means to pay. Therefore,
because reciprocal rights were not granted to the husband under
these statutes, they were declared unconstitutional.
However, in Lukens the superior court did not adhere consis-
tently to a true reciprocal rights test as it did in Wiegand. In
Lukens the court allowed substantially similar rights without dic-
tating equal rights.70 Under this test it is not necessary that the
husband have the right to receive support under all the circum-
stances which the wife does. Thus, it is sufficient that under
some limited circumstances the right to receive support from the
wife is available to the husband. This interpretation of reciprocal
rights does not conform to its common or popular meaning, or to the
equality of rights test required by the ERA.
In reality, the support laws do not create rights for the hus-
band which are reciprocal to those granted the wife. It is even
doubtful that they provide the husband with a substantial right
67. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 285, 310 A.2d 426, 429
(1973).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955).
70. Commonwealth ex Tel. Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. 227, 229,
303 A.2d 522, 523 (1973).
to support, as indicated in Lukens.71 Under the "Poor Laws" the
husband is entitled to support from his wife only when he is indi-
gent, and she possesses sufficient means to provide support.72 The
term indigent has been judicially interpreted to include not only
those who are completely destitute, but also those "whose means
are not sufficient to adequately provide for their maintainence
and support. ' '7 3 Conversely, the duty to support the family is
placed upon the husband by law. 74 The wife does not have to be
indigent to qualify for support, since this right is bestowed upon
her by the marriage contract. The wife has the right to receive
support from her husband, even though she is gainfully employed
and has earning capacity. 75 Unlike her husband, its receipt does
not depend upon her financial status, although this is "one of the
relevant circumstances to be considered in fixing the amount of an
order. ' 70 This state of the law hardly constitutes a reciprocal ar-
rangement in which husband and wife enjoy the same rights. The
husband's right is more limited, since he is denied rights under
numerous other support statutes in which only the wife has a rem-
edy.77 As long as the primary duty of support is placed upon the
husband, then the support duty is not a reciprocal arrangement be-
tween husband and wife. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
provides for such a reciprocal arrangement in which both spouses
are entitled to support. 8
A reconciliation of the Wiegand and Lukens cases rests per-
haps on social rather than legal grounds. If the superior court had
found the support statutes invalid, unfavorable public reaction
would undoubtedly result at this change in the law which would
no longer require a husband to support his wife. Many fear that
this application of the ERA would change the institution of the fam-
ily as it is currently known. 79 Or, alternatively, it may have been
the fear of the court that without the support laws the family
would cease to function as a financially independent unit.8 0 This
71. Id. at 229, 303 A.2d at 523.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968).
73. Commonwealth ex rel. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 48 Del. Co. 115, 118 (Pa.
C.P. 1960).
74. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Shotz v. Shotz, 130 Pa. Super. 561, 564,
198 A. 472, 474 (1938).
75. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Liuzzi v. Liuzzi, 142 Pa. Super. 239,
241, 15 A.2d 738, 739 (1940); Commonwealth ex rel. Shotz v. Shotz, 130
Pa. Super. 561, 564, 198 A. 472, 474 (1938).
76. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Liuzzi v. Liuzzi, 142 Pa. Super. 239,
241, 15 A.2d 738, 739 (1940).
77. See note 23 supra.
78. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, Aug. 1-7, 1970, as amended, Aug. 27,
1971.
79. See Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871, 945 (1971).
80. E.g., Estate of Worrell, 61 Pa. 105 (1869). See also Comment, The
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would be of particular concern to the state, because it would ulti-
mately have to subsidize those families not able to support them-
selves.
On the other hand, the effect of the Wiegand decision declar-
ing divorce from bed and board unconstitutional is unlikely to elicit
a storm of protest, since in the past it has been a highly criticized
statute. It has been observed that because divorce from bed and
board is basically a judicial separation in which the parties are still
legally married"1 it places them in an unnatural position in which
they enjoy none of the privileges of married life, yet do not have the
liberty of being single.8 2 Since most of its benefits to the wife can
now be gained by actions for support or under the feme sole trader
acts,83 it has been suggested that it is an anachronistic remedy. 4
Finally, it has been observed that in recent years few divorces from
bed and board have actually been prosecuted to a final decree.
Commenting on this situation, the court in Heymann v. Heymann,
Jr. stated:
Actions instituted (for divorce from bed and board) are
very seldom prosecuted to the final entry of an order for
permanent alimony. In Philadelphia, only ten orders for
permanent alimony were ordered in 1970 and five in 1971
Actions are instituted principally as a ploy in efforts
to obtain favorable property settlements. In most cases,
the actions are either dropped or converted to actions for
divorce a.v.m. (from the bond of matrimony)."
For these reasons it appears that the decision in Wiegand to declare
divorce from bed and board unconstitutional will not have a pro-
found effect upon the law of domestic relations in Pennsylvania.
Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania, 77 DIcK.
L. REV. 254, 256 (1973).
81. E.g., Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 525, 32 A.2d
921, 926 (1943).
82. Dickenson v. Dickenson, 1 Del. Co. 293 (Pa. C.P. 1878).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 41, 42 (1965).
84. A. FREEDMAN & M. FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
PENNSYLVANIA § 354 (1917).
85. Heymann v. Heymann, Jr., 53 Pa. D.&.C.2d 545, 547 (C.P.
Phila. 1971) (explanations added).
86. The court in Wiegand explicitly declined to decide on the issue of
the retroactive effect of its decision on divorce from bed and board. In
Corso, it was held that the decision to declare divorce from bed and board
unconstitutional should operate prospectively only. In reaching this con-
clusion the court relied upon the criminal law cases in which this same
problem has been encountered. Among them are: Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967) (right to counsel at identification proceedings); United
States ex rel. Dickerson v. Rundle, 430 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970) (right to
counsel after incarceration following preliminary hearing); Jones v. United
As noted in Wiegand,87 even if the legislature should act to amend
the statute to provide reciprocal rights to husband and wife, with
the present socio-economic structure of society more women would
qualify for benefits than men. Support would be granted to
the spouse who could demonstrate the need and the fact that the
other spouse has the financial ability to pay support. Clearly, the
wife will qualify more often than the husband because she is the
spouse in our society with the more limited financial means.
The decision of the Wiegand court to declare alimony pendente
lite unconstitutional is a more drastic measure which is likely to
prompt quick legislative action to conform the statute to the stand-
ards set out by the court. Again, once this is accomplished, women
will remain the most frequent beneficiaries of the act. But the im-
portant point is that the ERA would have made it possible for the
husband to receive the benefits of these statutes when he can show
that he qualifies under their requirements.
Wiegand is an Lmpnrtant decision because it marks the first
time that an appellate court in Pennsylvania used the ERA to de-
clare domestic relation statutes unconstitutional. Making use of the
"reciprocal rights" test, the superior court reversed its earlier de-
cision in the Henderson case. It is quite possible that as a result of
the Wiegand decision the Pennsylvania legislature will amend the
divorce from bed and board and alimony pendente lite statutes in
order to provide equal rights to husband and wife in accordance
with the ERA. But the most significant result of the Wiegand
decision is that the law of domestic relations in Pennsylvania has
advanced further in the concept that it should operate equally be-
tween the spouses.
WILLIAM J. DONOHUE
States, 305 F. Supp. 465 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is a defense to prosecution under the Marijuana Tax Act); Common-
wealth v. O'Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A.2d 497 (1970) (instruction that all
felonious homicide is presumed to be second degree murder); Common-
wealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 269 A.2d 898 (1970) (right to counsel at
commitment hearing). These cases have held that a constitutional deci-
sion should not be given retroactive effect if it imposes a great burden
upon the legal system by the retrial of a large volume of cases. In Corso
it was held that this principle was broad enough to extend to constitutional
decisions in the field of domestic relations. As a practical matter this is
the best decision since it avoids crowding the already overburdened
courts with a relitigation of divorce from bed and board cases.
87. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 282, 310 A.2d 426, 428
(1973).
TORTS-EFFECT OF INTERVENING
NEGLIGENCE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE
Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973).
In Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky,1 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania resolved the inconsistency of two conflicting lines of
Pennsylvania case law dealing with the effect of an intervening
act of negligence on proximate causation. 2 One line of cases- held
that "an act of negligence which creates merely a passive back-
ground or circumstance of an accident does not give rise to a right
of recovery if the accident was in fact caused by an intervening
act of negligence which is a superseding cause."'4 This meant that
once the court had made the determination that the original ac-
tor's conduct created only a passive background or circumstance
to the accident, any intervening act of any kind by a second actor
automatically became a superseding cause of the accident. 5 The
opposing line of cases6 followed the reasoning of section 447 of the
1. 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973).
2. Where the intervening act of negligence relieves the original tort-
feasor of liability, it is said to be a superseding cause. See notes 28 and
29 and accompanying text infra for a definition of superseding cause.
3. Cotter v. Bell, 417 Pa. 560, 562, 208 A.2d 216, 218 (1965); Kaplan
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 404 Pa. 147, 149, 171 A.2d 166, 167 (1961); Kite
v. Jones, 389 Pa. 339, 345-46, 132 A.2d 683, 686 (1957); Listino v. Union
Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 37, 124 A.2d 83, 85 (1956) (incorrectly cited in Ap-
pellee's Brief on page 2 as a 1959 case).
4. DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484,
488-89, 112 A.2d 372, 374 (1955). There exist a distinction between the
"passive background or circumstance" theory and the term "passive"
negligence as used in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 441 (1965), Com-
ment b. "Active" and "passive" negligence. The former refers to a phrase
which is not only descriptive of the original actor's conduct but will also
relieve the original actor of liability whereas the latter is only used in a
descriptive sense to identify the original actor's negligence, called "passive,"
from the intervening actor's conduct which is called "active."
5. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text infra as to the distinc-
tion between an intervening negligent act and a superseding cause.
6. White v. Rosenberry, 441 Pa. 34, 39, 271 A.2d 341, 343 (1970);
Clevenstien v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 402, 266 A.2d 623, 625 (1970); Whit-
ner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 461, 263 A.2d 889, 896 (1970); Bleman v. Gold,
431 Pa. 348, 354, 246 A.2d 376, 380 (1968); Skoda v. West Penn Power Co.,
411 Pa. 323, 330, 191 A.2d 822, 826 (1963); Shimer v. Bangor Gas Co.,
410 Pa. 92, 97, 188 A.2d 734, 737 (1963); Polinelli v. Union Supply Co.,
403 Pa. 547, 552, 170 A.2d 351, 354 (1961); Stark v. LeHigh Foundary Inc.,
388 Pa. 1, 11, 130 A.2d 123, 130 (1957); Roadman v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 492,
108 A.2d 754, 759 (1954); Levine v. Mervis, 373 Pa. 99, 103, 85 A.2d 368,
370 (1953); St. John v. Kepler, 360 Pa. 528, 534, 61 A.2d 875, 878 (1948);
Malitiovski v. Harshaw Chem. Co., 360 Pa. 279, 284, 61 A.2d 846, 848 (1948);
Restatement (Second) of Torts.7 This rationale does not auto-
matically make the negligence of an intervening actor a super-
seding cause of an accident, but requires that the intervening ac-
tor's conduct be so extraordinary8 as not to be foreseeable 9 before
the original negligent conduct is excused. The inconsistency be-
tween these conflicting lines of decisions was resolved in Flick-
inger, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly adopted
section 447 of the Restatement (Second) 10 of Torts as the "con-
trolling rule of law in Pennsylvania"" and expressly rejected the
passive background or circumstance line of cases by stating that
"this Court will no longer attempt to solve questions of proximate
causation by resort to the label passive."
1 2
In Flickinger, defendant motorist Ritsky, who's view was ob-
structed by a pile of dirt left on the berm of the highway, drove
onto the highway and collided with a motorcycle driven by the
plaintiff's decedent. The plaintiff brought a survival action against
Ritsky on the theory that he was negligent in driving onto the
highway without an adequate view of the oncoming traffic and
joined the Marona Construction Company as an additional de-
fendant on the theory that Marona was negligent in permitting
the pile of dirt to obstruct the vision of drivers such as Ritsky.'"
The case was settled as to Ritsky who executed a joint tortfeasor
release. 14 The trial court, relying on Cotter v. Bell,15 granted the
Styer v. City of Reading, 360 Pa. 212, 218, 61 A.2d 382, 385 (1948); Brogan
v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 208, 213 n.6, 29 A.2d 671, 673 (1943); Mautino
v. Piercedale Supply Co., 338 Pa. 435, 440, 13 A.2d 51, 54 (1940); Nelson v.
Duquesne Light Co., 338 Pa. 37, 53-54, 12 A.2d 299, 307 (1940); Hendricks v.
Pyramid Motor Freight Corp., 328 Pa. 570, 574, 195 A. 907, 909 (1938);
Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 A. 43, 46, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937);
Kovacs v. Ajhar, 130 Pa. Super. 149, 156, 196 A. 876, 879 (1938).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965):
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent
in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a super-
seding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent con-
duct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have
realized that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the
act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly
extraordinary that the third person so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation
created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done
is not extraordinarily negligent.
8. Clevenstien v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 401, 266 A.2d 623, 625 (1970).
9. Roadman v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 492, 108 A.2d 754, 759 (1955).
10. The only difference between the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 447
(1934) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965) is in sub-
section (c) where the words, "response to" in the former are replaced by
the words, "consequence of" in the latter. In all other respects the two
are the same. See Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 461 n.10, 263 A.2d 889,
896 n.10 (1970).
11. 452 Pa. 69, 74, 305 A.2d 40, 43 (1973).
12. Id. at 76, 305 A.2d at 44.
13. Record, at 5a-6a, Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d
40 (1973).
14. 452 Pa. 69, 71, 305 A.2d 40, 41 (1973). Joint tortfeasors are con-
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Construction Company's motion for a judgment n.o.v. The Su-
perior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's holding.'0
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the plain-
tiff argued that Cotter v. Bell, and its predecessors,ir following
the "passive background" theory, were overruled by Clevenstien
v. Rizzuto.' s The Flickinger court, without expressly agreeing with
the plaintiff's contention as to Clevenstien, reversed the superior
court, vacated the judgment n.o.v., and remanded the case to the
trial court for entry of judgment on the jury's verdict.' 9 Thus
the supreme court, in refusing to consider questions of proximate
causation in terms of passive backgrounds or circumstances, seized
the opportunity to resolve an eighteen year old conflict regarding
the effect of intervening negligence on proximate causation in
Pennsylvania.
Prior to discussing the court's holding in Flickinger or the de-
velopment of the case law preceding it, it is necessary to distinguish
the concept of factual causation from that of proximate causation
and the concept of an intervening cause from that of a superseding
cause. The concept of factual causation, also referred to as "causal
connection" and "cause in fact,"20 is essentially the question of
current wrongdoers who have caused the same loss and under common law,
a release, i.e., surrender of a cause action, to one of two joint tortfeasors
was a complete surrender of any cause of action against the other, and a
bar to any suit against him. However, the vast majority of the courts
today hold that a release as to one joint tortfeasor is not a release as to the
other. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, at 301-03 (4th ed. 1971) [herein-
after referred to as PROSSER].
15. 417 Pa. 560, 208 A.2d 216 (1965). The trial court held, "We are
of the opinion that the aforecited cases of Kite v. Jones, [389 Pa. 339, 132
A.2d 683 (1961)] and Cotter v. Bell, supra, are in point and directly control
the issue to be decided in this case." See Record, at 120a, Flickinger
Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973). But see the trial court's
statement on page 129a of the record, wherein the court, after being ap-
prised of the Supreme Court's opinion in Clevenstien v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa.
397, 266 A.2d 623 (1970), said, "had the court had knowledge [of Cleven-
stien] at that time that its opinion was filed, a different decision of the
motion for judgment n.o.v. might have resulted." The trial court could not
grant the plaintiff's motion for a reopening and reargument of the case
because the appeal from the trial court's opinion had been docketed.
16. Flickinger v. Marona Constr. Co., 219 Pa. Super. 15, 279 A.2d 257
(1971). Judge Hoffman, joined by Judges Cercone and Spaulding, filed a
dissenting opinion in which he holds that even if Ritsky's conduct was neg-
ligent it was a "normal consequence" of the situation created by Marona
Constr. Co. and that Ritsky's conduct was not a superseding cause which
relieved Marona from liability.
17. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
18. 439 Pa. 397, 266 A.2d 623 (1970). See Brief for Appellant at 8-11,
Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973).
19. 452 Pa. 69, 77, 305 A.2d 40, 44 (1973).
20. Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L.
Rsv. 471, 473 (1950).
whether or not "the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's
harm?"21 It is a question of fact upon which "any layman is just
as competent as the most learned court to sit in judgment on and
for that reason is peculiarly a question for the jury."2 2  On the
other hand, proximate causation,23 which is often confused with
factual causation, 24 "is merely the limitation which the courts have
placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his
conduct." 25
Similarly, an intervening cause 2 6 is one which actively oper-
ates to produce the resulting harm after the negligence of the de-
fendant has already occurred. Ostensibly, intervening causation is
the problem of whether the defendant is to be held liable for an
injury to which he made a substantial contribution, when the in-
jury is brought about by a later cause of independent origin. In
-essence, however, it becomes a question as to the policy of the
court with regard to imposing legal responsibility upon the de-
fendant .2  When a court determines that an intervening cause re-
lieves the defendant from liability, irrespective of whether his an-
tecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, then that intervening cause is termed a supersed-
ing cause.28  This means that although the original defendant's
conduct did in fact contribute to the plaintiff's harm, the original
defendant is, because of policy reasons of the court, relieved from
liability.
29
21. PROSSER, at 237.
22. Id. See also, PROSSER § 41; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. Rlv. 543 (1962); A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE
TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LARILITY CASES
(1961); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956);
Hart & Honore, Causation in the Law, 72 L.Q. REv. 58, 260, 398 (1956);
Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REv. 185 (1950); Car-
penter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 941 (1935); and RESTATE-
mEwr (SEcoND) OF Tors §§ 432 and 433 (1965) which defines factual
causation in terms of whether or not the "actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another."
23. Also called "legal cause," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 431-33 (1965). See generally, Morris, On the Teachings of Legal
Cause, 39 COL. L. Rgv. 1087 (1939); Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L.
REv. 211 (1924); Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21
MiCH. L. Rsv. 34 (1922) and Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25
HARv. L. REV. 103, 106 (1911).
24. Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 74, 305 A.2d 40, 43 (1973);
PRossER, at 244; Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28
TEx. L. REv. 471, 755 (1950).
25. PROSSER, at 236.
26. PsOSSER, at 271; RESTATEMENT (SEcomD) OF ToS § 441 (1965):
(1) an intervening force is one which actively operates in pro-
ducing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission
has been committed.
27. PROSSER, at 270.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965):
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for
harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial
factor in bringing about.
29. Id. Comment (b).
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The question of whether the defendant's conduct is a prox-
imate cause of an accident, where there has been an intervening
act of negligence by a second actor, has led to two conflicting lines
of Pennsylvania case law.30 The first line of cases is predicated
upon the "passive background or circumstance" theory which in
turn is based upon a distinction between "cause" and "condition."
The basic premise of this theory is that, if the defendant has
created only a "passive background or circumstance" (a condition)
which made the harm that occurred possible, then any subsequent
act of negligence that occurs is automatically a superseding cause
which insulates the original actor from liability.3 1 The contra-
vening line of cases is based upon section 447 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts which is concerned with the nature and char-
acter of the intervening negligent act.82 This theory requires that
the intervening negligent act be "highly extraordinary" or done
in an "extraordinarily negligent" manner "before it will be
deemed to be a superseding cause that relieves the defendant
from liability."38  Both lines of cases place considerable reliance
upon the holding in Kline v. Moyer,84 which is cited by each con-
flicting side as supporting authority.3 5
In Kline, Mr. Justice Stern acknowledged that "[t]he doctrine
of superseding negligence is treated in section 447 of the Restate-
A superseding cause relieves the actor from liability irrespec-
tive of whether his antecedent negligence was or was not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the harm.
30. See cases in notes 3, 4, and 6 and accompanying text supra.
31. Accord, cases in notes 3 and 4. This theory has been highly criti-
cized and virtually eliminated in most jurisdictions in the United States.
See notes 47-53 and accompanying text infra.
32. PnossER, at 272.
33. See note 7 supra. There is a difference in the court's outlook in
these two theories. Utilizing the passive background theory the court
tends to ask the question why should the original defendant be held
liable? Employing the theory of section 447 of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS (1965), the courts tend to ask the question why should the defend-
ant be relieved from liability? See Psosszm, at 270-71.
34. 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937) (The intervening
negligent actor's view of oncoming traffic was obstructed by a stalled truck
left in traffic lane by the original negligent actor. The intervening actor
did not slow down nor pass the truck from a safe distance but drove
within 30 feet of the stalled truck and then swerved into the oncoming
traffic lane and collided with another automobile).
35. Compare Listino v. Union Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 34, 124 A.2d 83,
85 (1956) (Mr. Justice Musmanno dissented stating that "although the ma-
jority cites Kline v. Moyer, [325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, 111 A.LR. 406 (1937) ]
it fails to follow the logic therein"); DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484, 491, 112 A.2d 372, 375 (1955); with Clevenstien
v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 400, 266 A.2d 623, 625 (1970); Whitner v. Lojeski,
437 Pa. 448, 461, 263 A.2d 889, 896 (1970).
ment of Torts (1935) ' "1 and then formulated, in terms of section
447, a general principle to determine when an actor's negligent
conduct would or would not be the proximate cause of an accident
where there was also an intervening negligent act committed by a
second actor. According to Mr. Justice Stern:
Where a second actor has become aware of the exist-
ence of a potential danger created by the negligence of
an original tortfeasor, and thereafter, by an independent
act of negligence, brings about an accident, the first tort-
feasor is relieved of liability because the condition cre-
ated by him was merely a circumstance of the accident
and not its proximate cause. Where, however, the second
actor does not become apprised of such danger until his
own negligence, added to that of the existing, perilous
condition, has made the accident inevitable, the negligent
acts of the two tortfeasors are contributing causes and
proximate factors in the happening of the accident and
impose liability upon both of the guilty parties.3
7
Under this test, if an intervening negligent actor became aware of
the potentially dangerous situation created by the original actor's
negligent conduct and thereafter committed an independent3" neg-
ligent act of his own, the second actor's conduct would be extra-
ordinary and, therefore, would be a superseding cause relieving the
original actor of liability.A9
36. 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 A. 43, 46, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937); see note 10
for the difference between section 447 in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934),
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
37. 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 A. 43, 46 (1937).
38. 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 A. 43, 46, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937) (The inter-
vening actor's subsequent negligent act is independent where he has an
opportunity to avoid being committed to a situation which makes the acci-
dent unavoidable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965), Com-
ment c.:
A dependent intervening force is one which operates in response to
or is a reaction to the stimulation of a situation for which the
actor has made himself responsible by his negligent conduct. An
independent force is one the operation of which is not stimulated
by a situation created by the actor's conduct.
39. 325 Pa. at 364, 191 A. at 46:
Accepting that criterion [distinction between "normal" and an"extraordinary" response] it may be said that the first actor could
not be reasonably expected to foresee an act of negligence com-
mitted by the second actor after acquiring knowledge of the dan-
ger, and that such a subsequent act of negligence would be "extra-
ordinary" and not a "normal" response.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965) the actor's conduct would
not be a "consequence of" the first actor's negligence.
The general principle formulated in Kline was a restriction upon the
"last human wrongdoer" rule which it replaced. This rule was said to
have originated in the English case of Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East 1 (K.B.)
(1806) which holds that "if after the defendants' wrongful conduct there
intervened the wrongful (culpable) act of a third person, the latter relieved
the defendant from liability, and the 'last human wrongdoer' was solely re-
sponsible for the plaintiff's harm." Eldredge, Culpable Intervention As
Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 121, at 124 (1937), reprinted in L.
ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS, 210, 215 (1941). This rule has been
discredited, repudiated and virtually eliminated in the vast majority of
American courts and is "only of historical interest, except for odd bits
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Subsequent to the holding in Kline, the cases dealing with the
effect of an intervening act of negligence on proximate causa-
tion, followed either the Kline formulation 40 or section 447 of the
Restatement of Torts.41 However, eighteen years after his decision
in Kline v. Moyer, Mr. Chief Justice Stern introduced the "passive
background or circumstance" line of cases42 with his decision in
DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co.4 13 These
cases hold that even if the original actor is negligent in creating a
potentially dangerous situation which the intervening actor oper-
ates on, the original actor's negligence is not a proximate cause of
the accident because, as the court held:
an act of negligence which creates merely a passive back-
ground or circumstance of an accident does not give rise to
a right of recovery if the accident was in fact caused by
and pieces of peculiar law which survives here and there." PROSSER, at
247. See generally, Stone v. Philadelphia, 302 Pa. 340, 153 A. 550 (1931);
Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MNN. L. REv. 185, 199, 200
(1950); Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (1937);
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HIAv. L. REV. 149, 178-83 (1925) and
Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 118-25 (1911).
For a thorough discussion of the effect of Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357,
191 A. 43, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937) on the cases immediately preceding it and
the cases immediately following it see L. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS,
227 to 235 (1941) and L. ELDREDGE, PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS, RESTATE-
MENT OF LAW OF TORTS, 251 to 256 (1953).
40. See, e.g., Jeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360, 365-66, 100 A.2d 480,
483 (1953); Johnson Admr's v. Angretti, 354 Pa. 602, 606-07, 73 A.2d 666,
668 (1952); Ashworth v. Hannum, 347 Pa. 393, 398, 32 A.2d 407, 409 (1943);
Lobert v. Pack, 337 Pa. 103, 108, 9 A.2d 365, 368 (1950); Dominicen v.
Monogahela R.R. Co., 328 Pa, 203, 210, 195 A. 747, 751 (1937); Venorick v.
Revetta, 152 Pa. Super. 455, 457, 33 A.2d 655, 656 (1943).
41. See, e.g., cases in note 6 supra. Due to the paraphrasing of sec-
tion 447 by the Kline court, many cases have been decided that follow the
RESTATEMENT view but cite Kline as supporting authority even though
that case promulgated another test to determine proximate causation and
only referred to the RESTATEMENT in dictum.
42. Actually the initiation of the passive background or circumstance
theory was a partial reinstitution of the "passive condition" theory present
in Stone v. City of Philadelphia, 302 Pa. 340, 153 A. 550 (1931) which
Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937) restricted.
See F. HARPER, READINGs iN TORTS, 417-19 (1941) and see also notes 3 and
4 and accompanying text supra.
43. 380 Pa. 484, 112 A.2d 372 (1955) (The original negligent actor
(Laundry Co.) left a truck parked on the sidewalk blocking it so that
pedestrians using it had to go into the street to pass the truck. When Mrs.
DeLuca stepped into the street and attempted to go around the truck cab
she was struck by an automobile. The majority of the court held that
Mrs. DeLuca's negligence in attempting to. go around the truck was a
superseding cause because the blocked sidewalk was merely a passive
background or circumstance. The harshness of this decision is evident
for Mrs. DeLuca could not see over or through the truck and when she
attempted to step in front of the truck to see she Was struck by the auto-
mobile).
an intervening act of negligence which is a superseding
cause.
44
Under this theory any intervening act of negligence, which in
fact 45 caused the accident, has the effect of automatically insulating
the original actor from liability. The insulating effect occurs re-
gardless of whether the intervening negligent act is dependent
upon or independent from the actor's negligence or whether it is a
normal consequence of the original actor's negligence or an extra-
ordinary act of negligence committed by the intervening actor.
For each opinion in which the DeLuca decision has been fol-
lowed by the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there
has been a concommitant dissenting opinion criticizing it.4 6 Not
only has the holding itself been criticized, but in 'addition the un-
derlying basis of that decision, i.e., the distinction between "cause"
and "condition," has been severely criticized and "almost entirely
discredited. ' 4T The basic reason for eschewing the distinction is
that "it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
["causes"] and passive situations ["conditions"], particularly since,
as invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before."4 8  The making of this distinction
has been referred to as "bewildering and unnecessary,"4 9 "likely
to mislead," 50 "confusing and of no value" 51 and "dangerous to re-
fine upon."52  Although the difficulty in distinguishing between
"cause" and "condition" has been the primary reason for discred-
iting it, the better reason for discrediting the distinction is that
"it is not the distinction between 'cause' and 'condition' which is
important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the in-
tervening cause."53 If the nature of the risk was such that a rea-
sonable man, apprised of the situation, would not have regarded
44. Id. at 488-89, 112 A.2d at 374.
45. See notes 20 through 22 and accompanying text supra.
46. Cotter v. Bell, 417 Pa. 560, 208 A.2d 216 (1965) (Justices Cohen
and Mussmanno dissent); Kaplan v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 404 Pa. 147,
171 A.2d 166 (1961) (Justice Mussmanno dissents); Kite v. Jones, 389 Pa.
339, 132 A.2d 683 (1957) (Justice Mussmanno dissents); Listino v. Union
Paving Co., 386 Pa. 32, 124 A.2d 83 (1956) (In his provident dissent, Mr.
Justice Mussmanno remarked that, "[iit is my considered judgment that
the DeLuca case represents a gross miscarriage of justice which is apparent
in the casual reading of its facts." Id. at 45, 124 A.2d at 89).
47. Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 76, 305 A.2d 40, 44 (1973)
(quoting W. PROSSER, LAw or TORTS § 49, at 286 (1964) ).
48. PRossm, at 247. See also, Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort,
25 HA Iv. L. Rzv. 103, 110 (1911).
49. Green, Proximate Cause in Connecticut Negligence Law, 24 CONN.
BAR JouRmAL 24, 34 (1950).
50. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HAv. L. Ray. 103, 111
(1911).
51. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Com-
mon Law, 9 COL. L. REv. 137, 144 n.23 (1909).
52. F. PoLLocK, TORTS, 8th ed., 454 n.1 (1895).
53. Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 76, 305 A.2d 40, 44 (1973)
(quoting W. PRossER, LAW or TORTS § 49, at 286 (1964)).
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the conduct of a subsequent actor as highly extraordinary, or if the
character of the intervening act was such that a reasonable man
would not have regarded the negligence of the subsequent actor
as extraordinary, then the subsequent negligence is merely an in-
tervening cause and not a superseding cause that would relieve the
original actor from liability.
It is submitted that the line of cases following the DeLuca
rationale was able to coexist with that following section 447 of
the Restatement of Torts, because of the antecedent support that
each finds in Kline v. Moyer.54 The former line of cases finds sup-
port in the general principle formulated by Mr. Justice Stern in
Kline, whereas the latter finds support in his acknowledgement of
section 447.55 These two divergent lines of cases were able to co-
exist for more than eighteen years despite the fact that the ma-
jority of the cases followed the reasoning of section 447.58 This
section had been referred to by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
as being "cited with approval"57 or as containing the "general
rule"5 8 applicable to those cases involving the effect of intervening
negligence on proximate causation. Notwithstanding these state-
ments, the supreme court nevertheless held in Cotter v. Bell,
59
that the reasoning of DeLuca was controlling.
Cotter v. Bell was the last Pennsylvania Supreme Court deci-
sion following the passive background or circumstance theory. It
was also the first instance wherein the question of superseding
cause was decided at a preliminary stage of the hearing. 60 The
majority of the court was cognizant of the possibility that some
might "question the legal correctness of entering judgment on the
pleadings," 61 however, the court nevertheless maintained that the
undisputed facts clearly indicated that no claim could be set forth
upon which relief could be granted.6 2 The legal correctness of
entering judgment on the pleadings was forthrightly questioned
by dissenting Justices Cohen and Musmanno 8 and was a major
54. 325 Pa. 357, 364, 191 A. 43, 53, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937); see also,
notes 35 and 40 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 3, 4, and 6 supra. There are almost four times as
many cases following the RZSTATEMENT as there are cases following the
"passive background or circumstance" theory.
57. Roadnman v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 492, 108 A.2d 754, 759 (1955).
58. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 330, 191 A.2d 822,
826 (1963).
59. 417 Pa. 560, 562, 208 A.2d 216, 218 (1965).
60. Clevenstien v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 404, 266 A.2d 623, 626 (1970).
61. 417 Pa. 560, 563, 208 A.2d 216, 218 (1965).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 563-64, 208 A.2d at 218.
factor in the following disapproval of the Cotter case by the su-
preme court.
64
Subsequent to Cotter, the trend of the supreme court has been
to decide the cases involving questions of proximate causation in
the light of an intervening act of negligence, primarily in terms of
section 447 of the Restatement of Torts.65 In Bleman v. Gold,66
the court utilized section 447 and section 435(2)67 of the Restate-
ment of Torts to determine whether an intervening force was a
superseding cause. The court held that the answer to this ques-
tion depended on whether the character of the intervening negli-
gent conduct "was so extraordinary as not to have been reason-
ably foreseeable, or whether it was reasonably to be anticipated." 68
In Whitner v. Lojeski,6 9 the court, in determining whether an in-
tervening actor's conduct would relieve the original actor from
liability for his negligence stated that "the Pennsylvania cases
have sometimes conditioned an intervening actor's sole liability on
his awareness of the danger to be avoided at a time when avoid-
ance was still possible."7T However, the court held that:
this is but another way of saying that negligence in the
face of a known danger is extraordinary . . . [therefore
such] negligence in the face of peril is properly denomi-
nated "extraordinary" and as in § 447(2) excuses the orig-
inal actor of liability for the harm brought about by the
intervening negligence.
71
In so holding, the court manifested its preference for section 447
and distinguished it 7 2 from the general principle formulated in
Kline which is primarily concerned with the intervening actor's
awareness of the potential danger created by the original actor.
73
In White v. Rosenberg,74 the trial court relied on section 435(a)
of the Restatement of Torts to determine whether the intervening
actor's conduct was a superseding cause. However, the supreme
court stated that; "In our opinion ... sections 443, 444, and 447
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts more closely describe the
facts of this case. '7 5 This trend toward adopting section 447 is
64. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
65. Most of these cases do not rely entirely on section 447, but in-
corporate other sections of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
66. 431 Pa. 348, 246 A.2d 376 (1968).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965):
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of
harm to another where after the event and looking back from the
harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court
highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.
68. 431 Pa. 348, 354, 246 A.2d 376, 380 (1968).
69. 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970).
70. Id. at 461, 263 A.2d at 896.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
74. 441 Pa. 34, 271 A.2d 341 (1970).
75. Id. at 39, 271 A,2d 343.
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
observable in Clevenstien v. Rizzuto,7 6 where the court relied ex-
clusively on section 447 to determine whether the intervening ac-
tor's conduct was a superseding cause.
77
In Clevenstien the supreme court reversed the trial court's
entry of judgment on the pleadings which had been based upon
the decision in Cotter.78 However, it is not certain from the court's
decision whether it disapproves of the fact that Cotter decided a
difficult causation question as a matter of law before the evidence
was in or whether the court also disapproves of the substantive
holding of the case. 79 It is also uncertain whether the Cleven-
stien court, although relying upon section 447 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, considers it to be controlling over the passive
background or circumstance theory or the general principle for-
mulated in Kline.
The Flickinger court expressly notes the uncertainty that ex-
ists in Clevenstien and thereafter clearly evidences that it disap-
proves not only with the practice of deciding questions of prox-
imate causation on the pleadings, but also with the substantive
reasoning of the passive background or circumstance theory of the
DeLuca case. In addition, the court removes any doubt as to what
is the controlling rule of law in Pennsylvania on the question of
proximate causation when an intervening negligent act is involved.
The accomplishment of the foregoing statements was indicated in
three manifestations by the court.
First, the court expressly abandons the passive background
or circumstance theory with the statement that, "this court will
no longer attempt to solve questions of proximate causation by
resort to the label 'passive'. °80 The court's reason for abandon-
ing the theory is the "recognition that 'the passive condition dis-
tinction is now almost entirely discredited.' "81 It is evident from
the express abandonment that the court disapproves of the pas-
sive background or circumstance theory which is the substantive
76. 439 Pa. 397, 266 A.2d 623 (1970) (Plaintiff was injured when the
intervening actor, who's view was obstructed by the original negligent
actor's parked car, drove his automobile into plaintiff's motorcycle at a
road intersection).
77. Id. at 402, 266 A.2d 626 (1970).
78. See note 15 supra. The court refused to distinguish Cotter on its
facts and based its refusal upon the statement that, "We prefer to be more
intellectually honest than to rely on such tenuous distinctions. Better
should we say, 'wisdom should never be rejected merely because it comes
late.'" Id.
79. Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 73, 305 A.2d 40, 42 (1973).
80. Id. at 76, 305 A.2d at 44.
81. Id.
holding of Cotter v. Bell and DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Co.
Secondly, the Flickinger court takes the final step in the trend
toward adopting section 447 of the Restatement of Torts by ex-
pressly and emphatically stating that section 447 is "[t]he con-
trolling rule of law in Pennsylvania"' 2 on the question of prox-
imate causation when an intervening act of negligence is involved.
In adopting section 447,88 the court not only quoted it verbatim but
also fashioned it into a test to determine when the original negli-
gent actor should be relieved of liability. The court said:
An intervening negligent act will not be a superseding
cause relieving the original actor of liability if that actor
at the time of his negligent act should have realized that
another person's negligence might cause harm; or, if a
reasonable man would not regard the occurrence of the
intervening negligence as highly extraordinary; or, if the
intervening act is not extraordinarily negligent.
84
This test involves the objective standard of the reasonable man
who would or would not regard the occurrence of the intervening
act as highly extraordinary, or the intervening act to be extra-
ordinarily negligent, or find that the intervening actor should or
should not have realized that another's negligence might cause
harm.
Finally, the court emphasizes that section 447 presents "fact
questions" which in the vast majority of the cases must be left to
the jury. 5 In placing the responsibility and burden of determining
not only actual causation, but also proximate causation, upon
the jury, the court refers to Comment b. to section 453 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts (1965) for support.88 This comment
states, inter alia, that if "under the undisputed facts there is room
for reasonable differences of opinion as to whether the act was
negligent or foreseeable, the question should be left to the jury.8 7
In acknowledging the appellee's arguments that in the past the
court has held "that people who have proceeded without due re-
gard for obvious physical obstructions to vision-fences, hedges,
parked trucks and the like-have been extraordinarily negligent as
a matter of law,"18 the court further stressed that such situations
are essentially factual questions for the jury. This clearly evi-
82. Id. at 74, 305 A.2d at 43.
83. See note 7 supra.
84. 452 Pa. 69, 75, 305 A.2d 40, 43 (1973).
85. Id.
86. lRsTATKumrN (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 453 (1965).
Comment b:
If the facts are undisputed, it is usually the duty of the
court to apply to them any rule which determines the existence
or extent of the negligent actor's liability.
87. 452 Pa. 69, 75, 305 A.2d 40, 43 (1973), see also REsTATrEAmNT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 434 (1965).88. 452 Pa. 69, 76, 305 A.2d 40, 44 (1973).
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dences the court's disapproval of any court deciding the question
of proximate cause on the pleadings, 9 however the court does
not foreclose the possibility that there may be cases where it is
proper to do so. Should the intervening actor perform a negli-
gent act in disregard of a known and appreciated danger, his con-
duct would be deemed extraordinary and the court would hold as
a matter of law that his intervening act is a superseding cause.
However, for the court to find the defendant's conduct to be ex-
traordinary on the pleadings would require that the pleaded facts
be so undisputed and incontrovertible as to preclude the possi-
bility that reasonable minds could differ on them.
In Flickinger v. Ritsky, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
by expressly adopting section 447 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965), has resolved the inconsistency between two conflict-
ing lines of Pennsylvania case law. By refusing to consider the
question of proximate causation in terms of the label "passive,"
the court has joined the vast majority of jurisdictions which have
discredited and refused to make the tenuous distinction of differ-
entiating between "cause" and "condition" and have thereby
avoided the harsh results that it generated. Under the newly
adopted test, an original negligent actor will not be automatically
relieved of liability by the mere labelling of his conduct as "pas-
sive," instead, the decision as to whether he will be relieved of
liability or held concurrently liable with an intervening negligent
actor, will be determined from an objective standard that takes
into account the nature of the risk involved and the character of
the intervening act.
BRUCE HART
89. Id. at 72, 305 A.2d at 42.

